

The University of Chicago

ATTITUDES OF FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENTS TOWARDS THE SPANISH
REOCCUPATION OF THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
DECEMBER, 1942

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I

On May 19, 1861, Queen Isabella of Spain accepted the recommendation of her cabinet and formally proclaimed the reannexation of the Dominican Republic. The little country occupying the eastern two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola, Spain's first colony in the New World, was thus returned to the mother country after twenty-two years of subjection to the Haitian Republic followed by seventeen stormy years of self-rule.

At least three factors help explain the consummation of this event. The first of these was a revived Spanish nationalism—a nationalism which was moved by the vision of restoring Spain's lost imperial glory and which found expression in the zeal of Spanish officials in Cuba and Puerto Rico to build up another empire in America. The second was the obsession of Dominican President Pedro Santana to place his country under the protection of a strong foreign power. And a third factor in effecting the annexation and in enabling it to last four years was the failure of any strong power either to take action to forestall Spain before she finally accepted Santana's offer, or to eject her once the reincorporation had been carried out. It is this last-named phase of the Spanish reoccupation of the Dominican Republic that forms the subject of this study.

One might reasonably suppose that the hostility of a stronger nation than Spain would have dissuaded that weak country from action. In 1861, however, the only states that might have thought their interests jeopardized by the Spanish venture and that were at the same time capable of mustering armed forces in the Caribbean sufficiently powerful to give Spain pause—to wit, Great Britain, France, and the United States—were either unable or unwilling to interpose a veto. The reasons for this state of affairs will be discussed presently. Let it be noted here, however, that in 1861 the only country anxious to check Spain, namely Haiti, was far too feeble to do so. Nevertheless, in pursuance of its own miniature Monroe Doctrine of opposing the reestablishment of any strong power on the island, the government of that little nation, under President Fabre Geffrard, protested to Spain, on

April 6, 1861, against the incipient occupation, and threatened to take such steps as would preserve her best interests. One can well imagine the inconsequential effect upon the Spanish government of objections emanating from willing but impotent Haiti.

Great Britain's attitude toward the reoccupation can best be described as a reluctant acquiescence. Two factors help explain the hesitant approval of Downing Street: first, the feeling that although British interests might eventually suffer, they were not immediately menaced; and second, Spain's promise not to reintroduce slavery. British policy had thus undergone a modification since 1844, when Lord Aberdeen, then British Foreign Minister, had hastened to assure Spanish and Dominican representatives in London that Great Britain had no objection whatsoever to a reassertion of Spanish control, and indeed would welcome such a step if it would forestall the annexation of the new-born Dominican Republic by France or the United States.

In order to understand the shift in British attitude from enthusiastic approval in 1844 to reluctant acquiescence in 1861, the larger change that had overtaken British policy with respect to French and American activities in the Caribbean beginning in the mid-'fifties must be briefly reviewed. England had sought before that time to prevent both the United States and France from acquiring positions of economic or political dominance anywhere in the area. This policy was exemplified by her efforts to forestall the annexation of Texas and Cuba by the United States and the consummation of real and imagined French and American intrigues in the Dominican Republic.¹ Great Britain's rivalry with the United States and France had not extended to Spain. In fact, British attitude towards the Iberian power had been in decided contrast. Weak Spain had carried no threat to British interests, and London had, therefore, manifested no objection to the addition of the Dominican Republic to the Spanish Empire, if this would obviate its falling into the hands of the United States or France. In other words, a feeble Spain was to play the rôle of a buffer state, a kind of Caribbean Ottoman Empire, to stand in the way of aggressive powers.

In 1856, Great Britain's policy towards the United States began to change, with both the Foreign Office and influential segments of the press concluding that British economic interests

¹ For fuller details on the British attitude, as well as Anglo-French coöperation in attempts to check United States expansion in the Caribbean and the reaction of the American public thereto, see J. Fred Rippy, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1926), chap. XI, and particularly p. 200 ff.

would best be served by abandoning active hostility to what many Englishmen regarded as an inevitable southward expansion by the United States. In this way, Britain would avoid what she feared might develop into a serious conflict with the North American power, while at the same time she could expect to enjoy the economic benefits which political stability imposed by that power in Caribbean lands might bring.² As for the British attitude towards French imperialistic dreams in the Americas, it likewise began to change in the mid-'fifties or shortly thereafter, perhaps as a result of the same factors that prompted the withdrawal of opposition to American expansion. The most obvious example of the modification in Britain's policy towards France was, of course, the acquiescing approach taken towards Napoleon III's Mexican venture of 1861-1867.³

The shift in British policy with respect to the United States and France after the mid-'fifties signified also an alteration in attitude toward Spanish activities in the Caribbean. Having abandoned active opposition to American and French expansion, England no longer felt the need to use Spain as a buffer against her two former rivals. On the contrary, she now viewed with distaste any prospect of a conflict between a resurgent Spanish imperialism and the American and French imperialism she herself was indirectly encouraging. Not only had she determined to avoid complications herself with the United States and France, but she hoped also to forestall the outbreak of a Franco-Spanish or a Spanish-American war, either of which would have a disrupting effect on her commercial relations.

With particular respect to the Dominican Republic, England's revised attitude led her to the apprehension that a dynamic Spanish imperialism in that little country might precipitate a conflict between an aggressive Spain and an equally aggressive United States or France. This possibility had been the cause of England's disapproval of certain anti-American activities carried on in 1856 by the Spanish consul in the Dominican Republic. The same desire to discourage Spain from again involving herself in complications with the United States still dominated Foreign Office thinking in 1861, when Martin Thomas Hood, the British consul in Santo Domingo City, reported that President Pedro Santana, on March 18, had publicly proclaimed to the Dominican

² This change in British attitude towards the United States is presented in greater detail in Rippey, *Latin America in World Politics* (3rd ed., New York, 1938), pp. 103-109.

³ Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867* (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 370-373, contains pertinent information on British policy towards this undertaking.

people his offer of their country to Spain. Lord John Russell, the foreign secretary, made perfectly clear that, while the only influence which would lead Britain to interfere would be a Spanish attempt to restore slavery, he doubted whether the proposed re-incorporation was in the best interests of both Spain and England. Russell's remarks so cogently express the revised British attitude towards Spain's position in the Caribbean that it is worth while presenting them in some detail.

Russell declared that the realization of Spain's ambition might eventually cause complications with France or the United States, particularly the latter. England's true interest, he asserted, as a country "naturally inclined to peace and systematically addicted to commerce," would lead her to "view a war between any two Powers as an event not only at variance with her principles, but to a certain degree injurious to her interests." He warned Spain that difficulties with the United States "might be in the end seriously injurious to her rule over her ancient possessions" and that such an event "would be viewed by Her Majesty's Government with lively apprehension and sincere regret." The foreign secretary apparently preferred that Cuba and Puerto Rico not pass under the control of the United States.

Russell recognized that the outbreak of hostilities between North and South precluded "any positive resistance to the Spanish reoccupation either by the Northern or Southern Confederation of North America." Nevertheless, he drew Spain's attention to the possibility that the paralysis of North American foreign policy might prove merely temporary, and went so far as to assert, "It is not impossible that when the Civil war which is now breaking out shall have been brought to an end, an event which may happen sooner than at present appears likely, both the North and the South might combine to make the occupation of the Dominican territory by Spain the cause of serious differences between the North American Governments and that of Spain."⁴

Evidently the foreign secretary took it for granted that the Confederate States of America would maintain their independence.

In this way Russell expressed British doubts that the annexation was in the best interests of either Spain or England. He manifested, however, no disposition to veto the measure on this account. As a matter of fact, the principal British concern in the

⁴ Lord John Russell to R. Edwardes, British chargé d'affaires in Madrid, May 14, 1861, in "Papers Relating to the Annexation of Eastern Santo Domingo to Spain," No. 11, pp. 14-15, House of Commons *Sessional Printed Papers*, 1861, LXV (London, 1862).

affair was humanitarian rather than political in nature, namely, the fear that Spain might seek to restore slavery in her onetime colony. Her apprehension on this score is understandable when it is recalled that involuntary servitude still remained an integral part of the social order in the flanking Spanish islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Leopoldo O'Donnell, the Spanish prime minister, well realized that this British fear might prove a stumbling block to the accomplishment of the project; and throughout April and May, 1861, he took special pains to emphasize that in no circumstances would slavery be reintroduced.

In fact, so much importance did the Spanish cabinet attach to cultivating the good will of Great Britain, that the royal decree of May 19, 1861, formally proclaiming the reannexation, carried a clause expressly declaring that in no case would the government reestablish slavery. Incidentally, this was the only stipulation in the decree pertaining to the exact terms upon which the reincorporation was to be effected.⁵ It is somewhat amusing to contemplate the officially stated reason for this proviso. Rather than give the British the satisfaction of feeling that their veiled threats had led to its insertion in the decree, O'Donnell and his associates announced that slavery was not essential for the cultivation of the fertile soil of Santo Domingo. Apparently, they had forgotten that their predecessors had deemed slavery to be essential during Hispaniola's colonial apprenticeship and that they themselves continued to regard it as a vital part of the agrarian economies of nearby Cuba and Puerto Rico. Whatever the real reason for the proviso of May 19, Lord Russell had become convinced, even before that date, of Spain's intention not to revive the hated institution, for on May 14 he asserted that O'Donnell's repeated declarations had "removed the main cause which would have led Her Majesty's Government to view the proposed annexation with dislike and repugnance."⁶

With the way seemingly cleared of any serious British objections, there then occurred an event which threw Lord Russell into consternation and threatened a British veto of the whole scheme. On May 14, the same day Russell made his statement expressing satisfaction concerning Spain's intentions, he received an alarming communication from Thomas Hood, the British consul in Santo Domingo City. Hood declared that one Cruzat, the diplomatic

⁵ See the "Exposición a su Majestad" of May 19, 1861, enclosed in Edwardes to Russell, May 20, 1861, in *ibid.*, No. 14, p. 24.

⁶ Russell to Edwardes, May 14, 1861, in *ibid.*, No. 14, pp. 14-15.

secretary to Rear-Admiral Rubalcava, the commander-in-chief of Spanish forces of occupation in Santo Domingo, had informed him that Spain would certainly restore slavery. What was worse, Cruzat had asserted that Spanish slave owners in Cuba and Puerto Rico would thereby gain the right to reclaim fugitive slaves who had escaped from those islands to the Dominican Republic, where they had been enjoying all the rights of free citizens. And worse still, Cruzat declared that even the descendants of fugitive slaves could and probably would be reduced to bondage. Hood feared that by the same principle those individuals who had been slaves in 1821, when the short-lived Dominican Republic of that year had declared its independence of Spain, as well as their descendants, would suffer the same fate.⁷

Russell at once demanded renewed assurances from Spain that she would not reintroduce slavery. He went so far as to write the British chargé, on May 29, 1861, that the British government felt it necessary that an act of the Cortes or a royal decree specifically assure former slaves and their children against the legal claims of their former masters.⁸ Doubtless, O'Donnell and his associates were much put out at the furor resulting from the unauthorized remarks of a petty subordinate in Santo Domingo. In order again to soothe Russell's apprehensions, the Spanish foreign minister, Saturnino Calderón Collantes, presented the British chargé a written assurance—virtually a written pledge—that the British fear was groundless.⁹ This response apparently mollified Russell and closed the matter; for when Calderón Collantes, in rejecting Russell's suggestion of May 29, declared that no special act was needed to bar slavery from Santo Domingo since it would take a special law to reestablish it, Russell did not press the issue.¹⁰ Thus, the main British objection to the reincorporation of the Dominican Republic in the Spanish empire was met and overcome, and England took no steps to prevent the return of the strayed Dominican sheep to the Spanish fold.

France's basic attitude towards Spain's reoccupation of the Dominican Republic is clearly evidenced by the fact that Napoleon III took no steps to forestall it. In other words, responsible officials in Paris saw in it no menace to French interests. In at

⁷ Hood to Russell, April 21, 1861, in *ibid.*, No. 10, pp. 13-14.

⁸ Russell to Edwardes, May 29, 1861, in *ibid.*, No. 16, p. 31.

⁹ Calderón Collantes to Edwardes, May 29, 1861, enclosed in Edwardes to Russell, June 3, 1861, in *ibid.*, No. 19, pp. 32-33.

¹⁰ Calderón Collantes' statement, as given in Edwardes to Russell, July 7, 1861, in *ibid.*, No. 20, pp. 33-34.

least one respect this is surprising. French agents in Hispaniola had, since 1843, sought unsuccessfully to gain the Bay of Samaná as a naval base, if not, in fact, to annex or establish a protectorate over the entire Dominican Republic. Their arguments had produced no action on the part of the Quai d'Orsay, doubtless in large part because of the intimated displeasure of England. But with the ascendancy of the ambitious Napoleon III, as well as the softening of the uncompromising British hostility toward the consummation of French designs after the mid-'fifties, and the inability of the United States, after Southern secession in 1860-1861, to interfere with the plans of European violators of the Monroe Doctrine, there remained nothing to impede the reestablishment of a French colony on the island. Yet Napoleon did not see fit to take advantage of the known pro-French propensities of many Dominicans and of the Dominican orientation towards France stimulated by the French representatives of earlier years.

In fact, a piecing together of scattered bits of evidence, in the absence of available direct correspondence on the matter between Madrid and Paris, establishes a strong case for the view that the French emperor was willing to leave the Dominican Republic to Spain in order to be able to devote all his energies to more lucrative fields in Mexico. There may even have existed an understanding, tacit or otherwise, to this effect between the two powers. As for possible French and Spanish motives on this matter, it is well known that by the late 'fifties a considerable number of French and Spanish officials, both in the Americas and in Europe, were itching to reassert European hegemony over certain parts of the Western Hemisphere, if for no other reason than to impress upon the expansionists of the United States that the hemisphere was not their inheritance. In 1858, for example, the Spanish and the French ministers to Mexico "discussed the advisability of joint intervention [in Mexico] in order to place a check upon the expanding and unrestrainable people who occupy the north of the new hemisphere."¹¹ Remarks like this suggest the possibility of collusion between Spain and France in their 1861 policy of curbing the Yankee and adding to their own overseas possessions.

In the assault on Mexico, Spain was to play, by virtue of her impotence and much to the resentment of many of her public figures, a distinctly inferior rôle to that of France. This was true even though Spain had pursued, if anything, a more aggressive course toward Mexico from 1858 to 1861 than had France. There

¹¹ Rippey, *The United States and Mexico*, p. 208.

was nothing, however, to prevent Napoleon's assigning to Spain, in the anti-North American drama, the subsidiary role of European intervener in the Dominican Republic, or at least his tacitly assenting to Spain's assumption of that rôle. Rumors that such was, in fact, his game were current in Habana as early as the summer of 1860. The already initiated movement of Spanish officers and supplies from Cuba to the Dominican Republic was believed in Habana to be part of a plan "carried out at the suggestion and with the full knowledge and approbation of the French Emperor, who, on his part, . . . [would] at the proper time bring the french [*sic*] portion of the Island (Hayti) under subjection to his Government."¹² Another inference that Napoleon III was not averse to Spain's action may be drawn from the declaration of Lord John Russell to the British chargé in Madrid on May 14, 1861, only five days before the Spanish ministry officially accepted Santana's offer of March 18, that the British government as yet had no inkling of any French objection to the Spanish reoccupation.¹³ But whether or not the scanty evidence justifies the conclusion that Spain entered the Dominican Republic with the backing or at least the acquiescence of France, it is an incontrovertible fact that France, like England, did not judge Spain's move sufficient cause to justify her taking preventive action.

But what of the policy of the United States? It might well be supposed that the North American government would certainly act to curb such an obvious violation of the Monroe Doctrine as a Spanish reëntry into the Dominican Republic. From the beginning of Santana's negotiations with Spain, however, the administration of President James Buchanan was unwilling or unable, because of the increasing internal dissension over the slavery issue, either to prevent Spanish imperialism or to increase American influence in the republic.

There can be no doubt that Buchanan and his secretary of state, Lewis Cass, were well aware of the events unfolding under Santana's and Serrano's leadership. Throughout 1860 the Washington government time and again was warned of developments in Santo Domingo by both the regular commercial agent, Jonathan Elliot, and William L. Cazneau. The latter had secured a third appointment as special agent to the Dominican Republic,

¹² Thomas Savage, United States vice-consul general at Habana, to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, August 27, 1860, in William R. Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-60* (12 vols., Washington, 1932-1939), XI, 988.

¹³ Russell to Edwardes, May 14, 1861, in "Papers Relating to the Annexation of Eastern Santo Domingo to Spain," No. 11, pp. 14-15, *loc. cit.*

with instructions to investigate the possibilities of securing a commercial treaty, as well as to adjust certain claims of American citizens against the Dominican government. Cazneau's new mission, like his previous ones, rearoused the apprehensions of the British and French consuls that the United States might acquire Dominican territory and undue influence over Santana. British consular and diplomatic officials on the island continued for years to feel it their duty to carry on the tradition of checking real and fancied American designs, notwithstanding the reversal of attitude on the part of responsible authorities in London beginning in 1856. From 1859 to 1861, their fears proved groundless, inasmuch as the United States achieved nothing more from Cazneau's third mission than the removal of discriminatory commercial restrictions against its citizens. Henceforth, the latter received as favorable treatment as British and French subjects despite the absence of a formal Dominican-American commercial treaty.

With respect to the Spanish-Dominican negotiations, Cazneau failed to receive definite instructions from Washington as to his proper course. He was therefore forced to confine himself to keeping Buchanan and Cass informed of developments. As a matter of fact, in the absence of a strong American policy toward the Caribbean republic, Cazneau's personal interests appear to have led him to view with approval the possibility of Spanish control. By 1860, he was well embarked upon his career of speculation in Dominican lands, and he was eager for the order and stability conducive to business prosperity that rule of the Dominican Republic by an outside power would presumably bring. Since it was obvious that the acquisition of the country or even of Samaná Bay by the United States was indefinitely postponed, Cazneau seems to have felt that Spanish annexation might prove the answer to his need. On the other hand, Jonathan Elliot, the regular commercial agent, who was Cazneau's bitter enemy, violently opposed the Spanish project and did not hesitate to express his opinions to Washington in his usual vehement fashion.

In effecting the reincorporation, both Santana and O'Donnell had undoubtedly taken due cognizance of possible adverse action by the United States and must have decided that there was little to fear from that quarter. Whether they would have pursued their policy had the United States violently opposed it is, of course, difficult to say. What is certain is that the unwillingness or inability of the Buchanan administration to do anything to uphold the principles expressed in Monroe's message to Congress made the way much easier for Santana and O'Donnell.

It was not until William E. Seward became secretary of state in March, 1861, that the United States began to stir itself at this and other manifest threats to the Monroe Doctrine. The new secretary had seen European influence in the Western Hemisphere grow during the decade of the 'fifties, in complete disregard of the doctrine. It was clear to him that this development had culminated in the drive against the Dominican Republic and in the impending intervention in Mexico, and he was anxious to reassert the resolve of the United States to maintain the doctrine of the two spheres. Moreover, to Seward the domestic situation also called for an anti-European policy. Despite the fact that the secession movement and imminent civil war seemed to preclude the possibility of effective action, Seward believed, as is well known, that both the domestic and the foreign crises could be met and solved by a single course of action, namely, a direct challenge to the European powers, with the expectation that the seceded states would return to the fold to face the common foe. This was the gist of the memorandum he submitted to President Lincoln entitled "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration." On April 2, 1861, he also addressed a stern note to Gabriel Tassara, the Spanish Minister in Washington, in which he invoked the basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine, though not mentioning that pronouncement by name, and invited Spain to get out of the Dominican Republic.¹⁴ For the next few months, Seward continued his uncompromising policy towards the Iberian power, and American diplomatic representatives in Madrid delivered strong notes to Saturnino Calderón Collantes, the Spanish foreign minister, calling his attention to the violation of the Monroe Doctrine inherent in Spain's move.

As may well be imagined, in view of the critical internal situation, Seward eventually was forced to modify his blustering attitude. Calderón Collantes, aware of the crucial state of the Union after the outbreak of civil war, instructed Tassara to impress upon Seward that the reincorporation of the Dominican Republic with Spain would be maintained by all the means at Spain's disposal.¹⁵ President Lincoln, cognizant of the danger to the Union in the plan outlined in Seward's memorandum, refused to allow his secretary of state to issue a direct ultimatum to Spain. Seward was therefore forced to recede from the advanced position

¹⁴ Seward to Tassara, April 2, 1861, MS in Notes to Spanish Legation, VII, Department of State Archives, Washington, D. C.

¹⁵ Perkins, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

he had taken. Profiting by the lesson he had learned, he temporarily ceased his menacing gestures and decided to wait until a more opportune moment for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine should present itself. As a final defiant gesture, however, the American chargé in Madrid, on June 19, 1861, formally protested against Spain's action in the name of the doctrine.¹⁶

Thus, aided and abetted by his control of political forces at home and the absence of effective opposition from abroad, Pedro Santana had finally succeeded in his seventeen-year dream. None of the powers principally concerned with the reincorporation had taken effective steps to prevent it.

II

There remain to be discussed the positions of the interested foreign governments towards events in Santo Domingo during the four years of Spain's unsuccessful attempt to hold what she had gained in 1861. In considering this matter, the observer should not be surprised to find no sudden change in the attitudes assumed in the spring and early summer of 1861. Great Britain, France, Haiti, and the United States, the principal powers concerned with Dominican developments, continued to view the affair virtually as they had at that time. In other words, Great Britain and France remained willing to let Spain have her way, while Haiti and the United States, though basically opposed to Spain's undertaking, remained unable to take effective steps against it—the former because of her chronic impotence and the latter because of more urgent business in the land of cotton.

Great Britain clung to the non-interventionist policy laid down by Lord Russell at the outset, although Downing Street must have felt some satisfaction when Lord Russell's warnings of 1861 that the reoccupation might not prove the happy venture Spain had anticipated were borne out by the ravages of yellow fever among the Spanish soldiery and the initiation by the Dominicans of the War of the Restoration in August, 1863. As between the contending parties in that struggle, England appears to have maintained a strictly neutral position. Long before the outbreak of hostilities, Dominican insurgents had sought to discover from the local British representatives the probable attitude of Downing Street toward an attempt to eject Spain. As early as April 5, 1861, even before the final Spanish decree of reincorporation, José Desiderio Valverde, who had headed an earlier

¹⁶ A copy of this protest is enclosed in Horatio J. Perry, United States chargé in Madrid, to Seward, July 1, 1861, MS in Despatches, Spain, XLI, Department of State Archives.

Dominican government and who was to become one of the leaders of the rebel provisional government of 1863, approached the British and French consuls to ascertain what assistance, if any, disgruntled Dominicans might expect from the two European governments in a revolt against Spanish authority.¹⁷ Late in 1862, a deputation from the Cibao expressed their grievances against Spanish rule in an interview with Martin T. Hood, the British consul at Santo Domingo City.¹⁸ And during the War of the Restoration, the insurgents sought continuously to gain the sympathy of the British government and, if possible, some form of tangible assistance.

British officials in London, however, hewed to the line of neutrality. It was not so with the zealous Hood, who was sympathetic with the Spanish cause. Like British agents before and after him, he deemed it his duty to stand in the way of the realization of true or imagined American designs, and he therefore continued the older British policy of encouraging Spain as a check upon the United States. Hood was suspicious that the North American government was merely awaiting an opportunity to annex not only Santo Domingo, but Haiti as well, and might use Spain's aggression as a pretext for an imperialistic course of action of its own. For a time after Santana's final loss of favor with Spanish officialdom in 1862, Hood had even feared that the former captain-general, with his "known American sympathies," might become the tool of the Yankees in an attempt to establish American control.¹⁹ Apparently, the British consul was still unable to perceive that the hands of the United States were tied, even had it wished to act decisively in the erstwhile Dominican Republic.

France, likewise, followed the course Napoleon III had set for himself both before and after Santana's public proclamation of March 18. In other words, the French emperor continued what was apparently his tacit, if not his positive, encouragement of Spain's challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. The one development that might have precipitated a reversal of Napoleon's atti-

¹⁷ Martin T. Hood to Russell, No. 18, April 5, 1861, MS in Foreign Office 23/45, Public Record Office, London, England, as summarized in an abstract of Foreign Office correspondence in the possession of Professor J. Fred Rippy of the University of Chicago.

¹⁸ Hood to Russell, No. 45, November 26, 1862, MS in Foreign Office 23/46, *loc. cit.*

¹⁹ Hood to Russell, No. 31, July 31, 1862, and No. 33, August 19, 1862, MSS in Foreign Office 23.46, *loc. cit.* Perhaps Hood was alarmed by the speculating activities of the Americans, Joseph W. Fabens and William L. Cazneau, and thought that the United States government was backing them in order to extend American control over the island.

tude passed without such an unfortunate occurrence for Spain. This was the temporarily strained state of relations between the two Latin powers occasioned by their joint intervention in Mexico.

Two points of friction came between them. The first was a controversy between Napoleon and official circles in Madrid over the proper candidate for the throne of the monarchy to be set up in Mexico; the second was the withdrawal of the Spanish forces in Mexico in 1862. The latter event was in large part caused by the inability of Spanish and French forces in Mexico to get along with one another and by the openly expressed belief of the Spanish commander that European intervention to control Mexico's internal affairs was a gross blunder. Napoleon III was very much put out at Spain's action, and might conceivably have sought means to revenge himself on the Iberian power for deserting the ship. That he did not do so was probably the result of his fundamental desire, and that of Spanish officialdom as well, for harmony between their respective governments. Napoleon, in his relations with Spain as with other powers, was attempting to increase his influence, while official groups in Spain were, on their part, anxious to cultivate the good will of the dominant European land power.²⁰ Therefore, the Mexican altercation proved to be merely a passing rift, and Spain's Dominican enterprise continued to meet with no opposition from the French ruler.

In fact, the emperor, already facing revolts in Mexico, must have felt some kinship with Spain in her mounting difficulties with ungrateful Dominican insurgents. No doubt, Napoleon also realized, as the North gradually overcame the South in the American Civil War, that France and Spain were both likely to be eventually confronted by a hostile and powerful United States, intent upon compelling respect for the Monroe Doctrine. Perhaps this accounts for certain rumors reported by Gustavus Koerner, the United States minister to Spain, to be circulating in Paris and Madrid. According to Koerner, governmental and journalistic sources close to the emperor were accusing the United States of having instigated the revolution begun by Dominican patriots in August, 1863, and of openly extending them aid.²¹

With Haiti and the United States, Spain's relations were decidedly unfriendly. This was largely due to Spanish fears and

²⁰ This is clearly brought out by Gustavus Koerner, the United States minister to Madrid, in his *Memoirs* . . . (ed. by Thomas J. McCormack, 2 vols., Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1909), II, 380-388.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 338, 379.

suspensions that those two powers, though unable to make effective their known opposition to Spain's venture, would surreptitiously lend aid to the Dominican insurgents. The latter, too, seem to have expected assistance in some form from their western neighbor and the Anglo-Saxon republic. With respect to Haiti, the Dominicans' anticipation of support might at first glance appear to be fantastic, in view of past occurrences between the two peoples. A little reflection, however, reveals the logic of expecting help from Haiti. President Fabre Geffrard, who, it will be remembered, had protested vigorously to Spain against the incipient occupation in April, 1861, did not wish to see a strong power established in any part of the island, for such a power would then be a direct threat to Haitian independence. Moreover, Haiti still retained nominal title to the eastern part of the island; and while President Geffrard had given up virtually all hope of establishing Haitian control over the Dominicans, there remained unsettled the question of the boundary between the two countries. Even should Spain not attempt to annex Haiti, Geffrard feared she would at least insist upon the restoration of the old colonial boundary. This would be to Haiti's disadvantage, since she had long been in *de facto* occupation of territory east of the colonial frontier line.

During the first few months of the occupation, therefore, Geffrard aided Generals José María Cabral and Francisco del Rosario Sánchez in their revolt against Santana and Spain, but he soon grew apprehensive of the possible consequences of his action and withdrew his assistance.²² Notwithstanding Geffrard's reversal of policy, the Spanish authorities decided to teach him a lesson. Reports were current in Santo Domingo City that the forces sent by Santana to the frontier in late June, 1861, to crush General Sánchez might attempt to restore the old boundary, or even to commence the conquest of Haiti. Although this was not the Spanish intention at that time, six Spanish war vessels commanded by Rear Admiral Rubalcava, who was in charge of all Spanish forces of occupation in Santo Domingo, appeared off Port-au-Prince, on July 6, 1861, to force the recognition of the annexation, as well as a promise to pay for damage done by the Haitian-supported Dominican insurgents.²³ Geffrard was compelled to fire a

²² Sumner Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard: the Dominican Republic, 1844-1924* (2 vols., New York, 1928), I, 232-233.

²³ Joseph N. Lewis, United States commercial agent at Port-au-Prince, to Seward, July 15, 1861, MS in Consular Letters, Port-au-Prince, IV, Department of State Archives.

twenty-one gun salute to the Spanish flag and to accede to the Spanish demands.

As might have been expected, however, this did not settle the matter. Bad relations between Spain and Haiti continued for the duration of the Spanish occupation. The Iberian power unsuccessfully sought to force the Black Republic to recognize the old colonial boundary,²⁴ and the latter renewed its clandestine aid to the Dominican rebels.²⁵ Furthermore, not only did the insurgents receive munitions and supplies from the legal Haitian government of Geffrard, but they also obtained similar help from the anti-Geffrard leader, General Sylvain Salnave, when that figure initiated a revolt against Geffrard in 1863.²⁶

The outside assistance most anticipated by the Dominicans, however, failed to materialize. The expected source of this aid was the United States. Nevertheless, Spain's principal worry during the four years of the reoccupation was her concern over what the United States was secretly doing, or might do, to foment and assist uprisings against Spanish authority, just as one main apprehension of the United States during the same years was Spain's policy toward the rebellious Confederate States of America. Although Secretary of State William E. Seward had been compelled to accept the Spanish violation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1861 because of civil strife in the United States, this fact did not mean that the North American government closed its eyes to the presence of Spain in eastern Hispaniola. Nor did it dissuade Dominican insurgents from hoping that the United States would eventually come to their assistance. In fact, they solicited aid almost immediately after Santana's proclamation of March 18, 1861, although they must have realized that the hands of the United States were tied. In the spring of that year, American agent William L. Cazneau reported that certain members of the Dominican Supreme Court and the Senate had originally intended to send to the governments of the United States and England solemn protests against the destruction of Dominican sovereignty. One of these leaders had gone so far as to present a copy of this protest to Cazneau, with the request that the special agent forward it to President Lincoln. But when these potential insur-

²⁴ See despatches of Seth Webb, Jr., United States commercial agent at Port-au-Prince, to Seward, April 7, 1862, and May 27, 1862, MSS in *ibid.*

²⁵ Ludwell Lee Montague, *Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938* (Durham, N. C., 1940), p. 96.

²⁶ Welles, *op. cit.*, I, 250.

gents had perceived that Santana and Spain had the situation well in hand, they had decided not to jeopardize their safety by signing these documents; and the protests, therefore, were never transmitted to Washington and London.²⁷

Long before the outbreak of the War of the Restoration in August, 1863, William Jaeger, the American commercial agent, was reporting that the Dominicans were hoping that the United States would soon be able to assist them against Spain;²⁸ and soon after a Dominican provisional government was set up at Santiago in that month, it initiated efforts to secure support. Vice-President Bernardo Rojas wrote to the American Minister to Haiti, explaining the causes of the revolt, predicting its ultimate success, and soliciting "the intervention of civilized nations, so that, viewing these acts in their true light, they may lend us their aid in the form of mediation, with the view of reëstablishing the autonomy of the Dominican people, of which they have been so treacherously despoiled."²⁹ On November 1, 1863, Foreign Minister Ulises F. Espaillet addressed identical notes to the United States, France, and Great Britain, through their respective local representatives, setting forth the treachery of Santana, explaining the justice of the Dominican cause, and requesting the good offices of the three powers to persuade the Spanish cabinet to restore Dominican independence.³⁰ Less than a month later, on November 24, 1863, Espaillet wrote Seward directly to invite American intervention in the interest of both the Dominican Republic and the United States. In this note he put to good use all possible arguments in favor of his position, regardless of their consistency. On the one hand, he stated that the provisional government had up to that time abstained from despatching envoys to European governments only out of respect for the United States and in anticipation of its support, while on the other he declared that the mutual interest of the two countries in preventing European intervention rendered practicable a protectorate of the Dominican Republic by the United States.³¹ At the same time that the foreign minister was appealing to Seward, Vice-President Rojas was writing Presi-

²⁷ Cazneau to Seward, May 13, 1861, MS in Special Agents, XIX, Department of State Archives.

²⁸ Jaeger to Seward, July 22, 1863, MS in Consular Letters, Santo Domingo, IV, *ibid.*

²⁹ Rojas to B. F. Whidden (no date), Enclosure B in Whidden to Seward, November 6, 1863, MS in Despatches, Hayti, I, *ibid.*

³⁰ Espaillet to Seward, November 1, 1863, enclosed in Espaillet to Seward, November 24, 1863, MS in Notes from the Dominican Republic, I, *ibid.*

³¹ Espaillet to Seward, November 24, 1863, MS in *ibid.*

dent Lincoln, soliciting the "interposition of a timely and protecting hand."³²

The delivery of these despatches to the American government was entrusted to one William Clark, an American citizen residing in the city of Santiago. Clark's instructions reveal even more precisely than the terms of the notes just cited exactly what the Dominicans hoped to secure from the United States. The general purpose of Clark's mission was declared to be that of winning the American people and American officialdom to the Dominican cause. He was, if possible, to secure assistance in money, munitions, and supplies from either the American government or private interests. He was to investigate the possibility of outfitting privateers in American ports to prey upon Spanish commerce. And he was to impress upon President Lincoln and the cabinet that the provisional government would like a properly accredited agent sent to Santiago and a few American warships to proceed to Puerto Plata or other Dominican ports.³³ It is obvious that had the United States acceded to each point of Clark's instructions, it would have been participating in the War of the Restoration as a non-belligerent, in the modern sense of that word. It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that Seward, who was resolved to maintain strict neutrality for the duration of the Civil War, refused to have anything to do with Clark.

Despite this rebuff, two members of the provisional government visited Port-au-Prince in December 1863, in order to confer with American Minister B. F. Whidden. They assured him that the Dominican patriots looked to the United States as their nearest and best friend and anticipated American recognition as soon as the military successes of the insurgents would justify the United States' taking such a step. In his despatch informing Seward of this interview, Whidden expressed the view that the United States could easily acquire Samaná Bay and peninsula from a friendly Dominican government.³⁴

Finally, on December 30, 1863, shortly after the provisional government's formal declaration of war on Spain, the Santiago authorities despatched another agent to the United States. Nothing daunted by the failure of Clark's mission, they ordered Pablo Pujol to Washington to confer with Seward. But again the secretary of state was distinctly discouraging to Dominican

³² Rojas to Lincoln, November 24, 1863, MS in *ibid.*

³³ Rojas to Clark, November 26, 1863, MS in *ibid.*

³⁴ Whidden to Seward, December 5, 1863, MS in *Despatches, Hayti, I, ibid.*

hopes. He had learned much since his rash advice to Lincoln in the spring of 1861 and was resolved not to arouse unnecessary hostility towards the United States in any European country. Hence Pujol received no answer to his note of February 1, 1864, requesting an interview with Seward.³⁵ On February 6, Pujol again asked for a hearing, even if it be only of an unofficial character. He assured Seward that he sympathized with the United States in its desire to avoid complications with Spain, but he pointed out that certain European powers, including Spain, had conferred unofficially with representatives of the Confederate States of America.³⁶ Pujol thus suggested that since Spain had received the representatives of the Confederates, the United States would be justified in consulting with the representatives of the Dominicans. At the same time, Foreign Minister Espailat, on February 14, 1864, addressed a note not only to the American but also to the British and French representatives on the island, suggesting that although they might not be ready to recognize Dominican independence, they might at least grant the Dominicans belligerent rights.³⁷

Despite these pleas, Seward was careful not to give support or encouragement to the insurgents. The United States was trying to prevent European powers from establishing friendly relations with the Confederate States; hence, it could scarcely afford to acknowledge Dominican independence and assist the insurgents. Such a rash policy might lead Spain, in reprisal, to recognize the Confederacy. Seward therefore instructed Gustavus Koerner, the American Minister at Madrid, to impress upon the Spanish cabinet that the United States had not received Clark and Pujol even on an informal basis, nor had it in any way responded to their solicitations.³⁸

Yet, in spite of this avowal of American neutrality, Spanish officials in Spain, Santo Domingo, and the United States were sure that the Dominicans were receiving aid and comfort from American sources, if not openly from the United States government then at least from private citizens operating with the clandestine support of American officials. They knew that the United States was fundamentally opposed to their reoccupation of Santo Do-

³⁵ Pujol to Seward, February 1, 1864, MS in Notes from the Dominican Republic, I, *ibid.*

³⁶ Same to same, February 6, 1864, MS in *ibid.*

³⁷ Espailat to Whidden, February 14, 1864, Enclosure C in Whidden to Seward, March 1, 1864, MS in Despatches, Hayti, I, *ibid.*

³⁸ Seward to Koerner, March 12, 1864, in *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1864*, Part IV, p. 12.

mingo and would probably assume a menacing attitude if and when it should successfully conclude the Civil War.

Spain could scarcely help becoming aware of the hostile attitude of American representatives in Santo Domingo. Jaeger, the American commercial agent, did not hesitate to condemn the Spaniards in the most explosive language and to predict that the United States would expel Spain when the proper time came. He once expressed his indignation in this fashion:

If Spain is silly enough to think that she will be allowed to usurp and take possession of a Republic, subjugate and massacre its free, inoffensive, and independent people, plant over them a despotic monarchy, desolate and lay waste the country, and destroy foreign property, she will find out her mistake to her sorrow. I can assure her and her menial vandals, that there is one nation that will not permit all this wrong without redress. Thank God, the day is not distant when the United States will have it in her power to square accounts with all nations who have been taking advantage of her troubles at home.³⁹

The commercial agent reassured Seward with respect to the consequences of a rupture with the Iberian power. He declared that the Spanish fleet in the West Indies was not fit for combat, no Spanish warship in those waters being in condition to survive the discharge of a broadside or cope with a well-conditioned vessel having but one good rifle gun of one hundred pounds. In September, 1863, he wrote Seward, "Through one of their Chief Engineers (an American) I learn that there are at this time ten Spanish Men of War lying in Cuba with their boilers burnt out and not fit to go to sea."⁴⁰ And upon a later occasion, he asserted, "... sometime ago, one of ... [the] principal [Spanish] Frigates, the Blanca (fifty-one guns, about five years old) fired a salute while at Port-au-Prince which so completely disabled her, that she was obliged to at once proceed [*sic*] to Spain for repairs."⁴¹

According to Jaeger, the Spaniards on the island exhibited great dread of the intentions of the United States. He asserted with vivid imagination that they manifested a pronounced horror of the Yankees and nightly dreamed that the latter were upon them. "Every revolution and disturbance that takes place on this

³⁹ Jaeger to Dr. J. G. Pfister of Santiago, Santo Domingo, January 10, 1864, MS in Miscellaneous Letters, Book No. 829, Foreign Archives, Commercial Agency of Santo Domingo City, Department of State Archives.

⁴⁰ Jaeger to Seward, September 28, 1863, MS in Consular Letters, Santo Domingo City, IV, *ibid*.

⁴¹ Same to same, January 10, 1864, MS in *ibid*.

Island, the cry is at once raised by the Spaniards, 'Oh, the Yankees have landed men and arms, the revolutionists are supplied with good weapons.' " He went on to say that Spain was well aware that she had stolen in when the United States had the rebellion at home to settle, and was therefore probably troubled by a guilty conscience.⁴² Jaeger might also have added that many Spaniards feared an attempt by the United States to annex the erstwhile Dominican Republic itself.

Spain's hostility towards the United States was carried into diplomatic channels. Upon several occasions, Gabriel Tassara, the Spanish minister in Washington, and the Marqués de Miraflores, the Spanish foreign minister, complained to Secretary of State Seward and United States Minister to Spain Gustavus Koerner, respectively, that the United States was failing in its duties as a neutral by not preventing violations of American neutrality by its own citizens. In vain did both Seward and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles assure Queen Isabella's government that the United States was doing its utmost to prevent such violations, and that the West Indies squadron of the American fleet was on guard to apprehend American vessels and citizens guilty of violating American neutrality laws. Unimpressed, Spain alleged that American merchant vessels were delivering munitions to the insurgents and that one such load had been landed at Cap Haitien under the very eyes of American warships anchored in the harbor at the time.⁴³ Rumors reaching Spain from such widely separated cities as Paris and Habana went so far as to assert that the United States had instigated the War of the Restoration, and Koerner found it necessary to assure the Spanish foreign minister that these charges were wholly false. The American minister declared his belief that the rumors emanating from Habana were principally the work of Confederates who had fled to Cuba,⁴⁴ while those from Paris stemmed from official and journalistic circles close to Emperor Napoleon III.

Tassara also protested to Seward against what he asserted were remarks favorable to the Dominican cause made by certain high American dignitaries. The provisional government at Santiago, Tassara averred, was citing these statements as evidence that the United States government officially favored the Dominican cause; according to Tassara, this encouraged many Domini-

⁴² Same to same, August 31, 1863, MS in *ibid.*

⁴³ Gabriel G. Tassara, Spanish Minister to the United States, to Seward, October 7, 1863, MS in Notes from the Spanish Legation, XIX, Department of State Archives.

⁴⁴ Koerner to Seward, October 8, 1863, MS in Despatches, Spain, XLV, *ibid.*

cans previously undecided as to their proper course to join the revolutionists. The Spanish minister informed Seward that while he did not for a moment believe the United States government was directly responsible for the damage thus caused Spain, he felt that it should take steps to restrain the more enthusiastic of its citizens from such remarks and should advise the Dominicans that their hopes for American aid were entirely unfounded.⁴⁵ He also brought Seward's attention to the fact that privateers preying on Spanish commerce were being outfitted in American ports. He demanded that the American government suppress this activity and warned that the Spanish government would treat all Americans engaged in this enterprise as pirates.⁴⁶ Tassara's accusation was true at least to the extent that American officials, whether from ignorance, negligence, or design, failed to prevent several Dominican privateers from leaving New York harbor.

All charges that the United States was not observing its neutral duties were flatly denied by Seward. In fact, he asserted that it was not the United States but Spain, by its acts of partiality toward the Confederacy, that was failing in this respect.⁴⁷ Among the Spanish government's violations of neutrality cited was its failure to prevent the frequent use of Spanish-held Dominican ports by the Confederate commerce raider, *Alabama*. But that government, like that of the United States, denied that it was not observing its duties as a neutral. Thus, the United States and Spain continued, until 1865, to accuse each other of aiding the rebels the other was attempting to suppress, and each denied the other's accusations.

With the arrival of April, 1865, and the end of civil war in the United States, Seward was ready to return to his stern attitude of four years before. It must be admitted, however, that the threat of American action to uphold the Monroe Doctrine was not the main factor which induced Spain to make her decision to abandon the island. The resistance of the Dominicans and the decimation of the Spanish forces by yellow fever had already dictated Prime Minister Ramón María Narváez's decision by late 1864—or some time before Seward renewed his threats of dire consequences to Spain should she renew her attempts to hold the colony.

⁴⁵ Tassara to Seward, November 19, 1863, MS in Notes from Spanish Legation, XIX; same to same, January 29, 1864, XX, *ibid*.

⁴⁶ Same to same, March 15, 1864, MS in *ibid*.

⁴⁷ Seward to Tassara, October 16, 1863, February 3, 1864, February 13, 1864, MSS in Notes to Spanish Legation, VII, *ibid*.; Seward to Koerner, MS in Instructions, Spain, XV, *ibid*.

By the beginning of the following year, Narváez realized, to be sure, that the Union would soon complete the subjugation of the Confederate States and that Spain would, in all probability, then have to reckon with the United States should she persist in her venture. Perhaps he foresaw American action against Spain of the type which was later to force France to withdraw from Mexico. Indeed, Seward's instructions of April 4, 1865, to Horatio J. Perry, the American chargé at Madrid, foretold such action, should Spain not complete the evacuation already decided upon. Seward wrote as follows:

It has been my earnest desire that Spain might anticipate the other maritime powers in retiring from the erring policy of 1861. I feel that she would have done so if she could have ever so little anticipated the events of the war during the present campaign. It is desirable that you press the question upon the Spanish Government . . . This proceeding in connection with the restoration of peace in Peru [Seward referred here to the simultaneous war Spain had been waging against Peru] and the retirement of Spain from Dominica would probably open harmonious and friendly relations between Spain and the United States for as long a period as statesmen are accustomed to foresee events.⁴⁸

This was Seward's polite but firm invitation to Spain at the end of the American Civil War to abandon her interference in the affairs of the Americas.

By April, 1865, however, Spain had long since decided to retire from "the erring policy of 1861." Her decision in this regard had not been dictated in the first instance by fear of what other powers might do. England had pursued a strictly neutral course; France had, if anything, been sympathetic to Spain; and neither Haiti nor the United States, though basically favorable to the Dominican cause, had, at the time the Spanish decision was taken, been able to furnish decisive aid to the Dominicans, or to indicate that such assistance might soon be forthcoming. Major credit for the Dominican victory must therefore go to the Dominican people, who, virtually alone and assisted only by the topography and climate of their country and by their ally, the yellow fever mosquito, played the principal part in bringing about Spain's complete withdrawal by July, 1865. There is no more courageous episode in their history.

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⁴⁸ Seward to Perry, April 4, 1865, MS in *ibid.*

